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FIRM PERFORMANCE AND INSIDER TRADING: A COMPARISON BETWEEN
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY FILINGS
Jeffrey Donaldso n. University of Tampa
Robert Weigand, Washburn University
We compare tite finan cial performance ami insider tradin~ characte~istics of.(irms f!ling for voluntary
bankruptcy witit firms titat are petitioned into bankruptcy t~volw1f~rtf~, by thetr credttors. We find that
' olders oiffirms filino fior voluntary bankruptcy expertence stgnificantly greater losses around the
· "d
s Itarett
t>
iffi
bankruptcy announcement titan sitareitolders of involuntary filers. We also find t1wt mst ers o tr~tzs
filing voluntari(v are net sellers of titeir firm's sit ares in th e years leading up to bankruptcy, vs. net ~uymg
by insiders of in voluntary filers. Moreover, firms filing volun~ary bankruptcy successfully reorga~tze less
freque ntly and liquidate more frequently titan firms that file mvoluntary bankruptcy. These findmgs are
consistent witft tite idea titat corporate insiders in firms filing for voluntary bankruptcy itave reduced
incentives to maximize sitareitolder welfare titrougitout the Chapter 11 process co_mpared with insiders of
firms tit at are petitioned into bankruptcy by tit eir creditors.
Introd uction

times formal bankruptcy was viewed as a criminal actdebtors unabl e to satisfy their debts were often
incarcerated . Liquidation of the firm was usuall y the end
result, and if creditors were not pa id in full following
liquidation, debtors freq uently remained incarcerated .
Attitudes
rega rdin g
bankruptcy
changed
substa ntially during the 1800s. The first provision in
U.S. law permitting the discharge of debt is found in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867. Restri ctio ns on the filing of
bankruptcy were further re laxed by passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. reflectin g a gradual decline in
the sti gma as oc iated with financial distress . Over the
course of th e 19'" ce ntury the percepti on of bankruptcy
evo lved from th at of an offe nse to the economic
com muni ty deservin g of punishment to nothing more
th an an unfortunate financial state of affa irs.
In response to the large number of business failures
durin g the Great Depressio n, the Bankruptcy Acts of
1933 and 1934 permitted vo luntary filin gs for the first
time. Under the new system. managers retained their
pos iti ons and played a major role in determining the
course of the firm 's reo rgani zati on. Thi s change in
procedure prompted num erous claims that managers
we re ab usin g th e process for their own ga in at the
expense of shareh olders, and the SEC launched an
investigation . The res ults of that in vesti gation , contained
in the Douglas Report, concluded that managers
res pon sible for firm s' poor financial performance
remain ed in office too long and acted in a self-serving
mann er to the detriment of public in vestors.
The findin gs of the Douglas Report led to passage
of the Chandler Act of 1939, which removed a
substantial amount of managerial di sc retion during the
bankruptcy process. Voluntary bankruptcy remained a

Much of th e resea rch in th e area of fin ancial
distre s and ba nkruptcy foc uses on whether managers
have the proper incenti ves to maxi mi ze shareholder
we lfa re durin g peri ods of fi nancial distress (e.g., Bradley
and Rose nzwe ig 1992, 1995. Altman 1993, Betker
1995a. and Chen. Weston and Altman 1995) . We
inve ti gate the fin ancial performance and insider tradin g
characteri sti cs of firm s durin g the years leading up to
th eir filing for corporate bankruptcy. In particular. we
co mpare firm s filin g for vo luntary bankruptcy with firm s
th at are peti ti oned into bankruptcy in vo luntaril y by their
cred itors. We find that shareholders of firms filin g for
vo luntary bankruptcy experi ence signifi cantl y greater
lo ses aro und the bankruptcy announcement than
hareholders of in vo luntary fi lers, and that in siders of
firms filin g vo luntarily are net se llers of their firm' s
hare in th e yea rs leadi ng up to bankruptcy (vs. net
inside r buyin g by manage rs of involuntary fil ers). We
also find that fi rm s fi lin g for vo luntary bankruptcy
uccessfull y reorganize less frequ entl y and liquidate
more frequ ent ly than firm s that enter invo luntary
bankruptcy. The e findings are co nsistent with the idea
that corporate in siders in firms filing for vo luntary
ba nkruptcy have reduced incenti ves to maximize
hareholder we lfare throughout the Chapter II process
co mpared with manage rs of firm s that are petiti oned into
bankruptcy by their creditors.
The debate regardin g managerial behavior durin o
bankruptcy is as old as U.S. bankruptcy law itse lf. In th:
ea rl I ~OOs bankruptcy proceedings were initiated by
co mpl aint from th e firm's creditors, similar to what is
now referred to as involuntary bankruptcy. In those
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rare provision und er the code, and firms that filed
vo luntary bankruptcy were often sued to allow more
contro l by cred itors. These laws remained largely
unchanged until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
This legis lation re-introduced the pre-1939 practice of
voluntary bankruptcy filing, w hi ch a ll ows managers to
remain with the firm and exert a significant influence on
the company's reorganization. The I 978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act a lso eliminated the SEC's role tn
investigating bankruptcies. Predictably, in the first year
following implementatio n of the reform act, 85% of
bankruptcies were vo lun tary filings by managers (see
Wruck 1990).
Existing theoretica l models often assume that
managers are acting in the interests of shareholders
during bankruptcy (e.g., Altman I 993 , Betker I 995a,
and Chen, Westo n and A ltm an 1995). T he results of
numerou s empirica l studies of bankruptcy and financial
di stress provide support for thi s ass umpti on. Khanna and
Poul se n ( I 995) find that the strategies of managers of
di stressed firms (e .g., downsizing, capita l structure
changes, investments and spin-offs) are si milar to those
of managers of healthy fi nn s in the same industry. As a
re sult, they conc lud e that managers of distre ssed finn s
often serve as sca pegoats, shou ldering more of the blame
for their firm s' misfortunes than is justified. Denis and
Denis ( 1995 ) provide further evidence on this iss ue .
They find that externa l factors such as recession and
regulatory change are important in ca using financia l
distress. whic h suggests that managers may not be solely
respon sible for the firm's poor financial performance.
Lang and Stu lz ( 1992) present evide ce of contagion
surrounding bankruptcy ann ouncements, whic h also
implies that financial distress may be at least partly
caused by industry-wide factors. Betker (I 995b) finds
that fir ms negotiating prepackaged bankruptcies spend
less time in financial distress than firms entering
traditional C hapter II , w hi ch suggests that the managers
of these firms pursue strategies intended to minimize the
impact of financial distress on shareho ld er wealth .
Other researchers co nclude that there is a greater
mi sa li gnment of manager and shareho ld er interests w hen
firms enter bankruptcy, however. One factor that
contrib utes to this problem is that incentive co ntracts
(performance-based bonuses and stock options) lose
most of their va lu e and are less effective for aligning the
interests of managers a nd shareho lders whe n firm s are in
financial distress (Wruck 1990 and Aghion , Hart, and
Moore 1992).
Seyhun and Bradley ( 1997) present evidence
that suggests a mi sa li gnme nt of incentives during
bankruptcy. They find that insiders se ll a significant

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol1/iss1/3

portion of their finn's stock in the years prior to filing a
bankruptcy petition . Seyhu n and Bradley acknow ledge
that while this fact a lone does not constitute prima facie
evidence that managers have breached their fiduciary
responsibilities to shareholders, it is nonethele ss tru e that
corporate insiders who reduce their ho ldin gs of their
firm's shares also reduce their incentive to maximize
shareho lder value. This idea is further supported by the
findings of Betker (I 995a), who reports a positive
relation between shareholder gai ns during C hapter I I
and the level of insider holdings in the firm .
Other studies conc lude that managers place their
firms into bankruptcy to capture the job protection
awarded them during the Chapter I I process . Delaney
(1992), Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992) , White (1983),
Wruck ( 1990), Aghion , Hart and Moore ( 1992), and
Hotchkiss ( 1995) all s uggest that managers whose fim1s
are in financial distress may have a preference for
Chapter I I because of the greater job protection afforded
by the bankruptcy process . LoPucki and Whitford ( 1993)
also document that generous compen sation and
severance co ntracts ("golden parachutes") are often
awarded to top managers when the firm is in the mid st of
a bankruptcy reorganization.
Bradley and Rosenzweig ( 1992) suggest that
managers pursue sub-opti ma l o perat in g strategies at
sharehold ers' expense during the bankruptcy period , and
that these managers may be seeki ng to obtain large
severance contracts and further entre nch themselves in
their firms when they file a vo luntary bankruptcy
petition . They a lso find that firms entering bankruptcy
are financially healthier following the 1978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act- post-Act firms have signifi ca ntl y higher
return on assets for the five years leadi ng up to the
bankruptcy filing . Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992)
further report that shareho lder losses for the six-month
period surrounding the bankruptcy a nn ouncement are
much larger fol low in g bankruptcy reform (- 63% vs.
-36% in the pre-Act period). Rimbey, Anderso n and
Born ( 1995) report si milar findings: negative returns to
shareho ld ers around bankruptcy anno uncements are
exacerbated following the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act.
If, as suggested by numerou s authors, there is an
increased misalignment of manager and shareholder
interests when firms enter bankruptcy, we would expect
to observe these firms perform in g poorly over an
extended period of time. Hotchki ss ( 1995) documents
poor long-term performance for firm s fi lin g bankruptcy
under the Reform Act. She reports that 40% of firms
emerging from bankruptcy continue to suffer losses in
the three years following bankruptcy, with a significant
number of second and third filings for these firms .
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se lling stock in their companies over the three year
period precedin g their bankruptcy filings. Outraged
creditors of these firms have formed committees charged
with investigating all insider sales that took place within
12 month s of the bankruptcy filin g, with the intention of
claiming the proceeds from so me of these insider
transactions . In a similar move, Ama lgamated Bank filed
a lawsuit all eging illega l insider trading that seeks to
freeze the bank accounts of seni or executives at Enron.

Hotchki ss ( 1995) concludes that thi s l o n g~ term
und erperformance is large ly du e to the contmued
invo lvement of pre- bankruptcy management, and that
Chapt
er
11 is not an effecti ve influence on the
rehabilitation of distressed firm s.
Given that th ere is a di stincti on in both law and
practice between vo luntary and in vo luntary bankrupt~y
fili ngs, and that most of the signifi can t chan ges 111
bankruptcy law ove r the past 70 years have been
concern ed with whether or not it is appropriate to allow
managers to file vo luntary Chapter I I and continue thei r
involvement with the firm, we examine whether there
are any eco nomic differences between the two types of
fi lin gs. If there is an increased mi sa lignment of manager
and sharehold er interests when firm s enter bankruptcy,
we hypothe ize th at ev idence of thi s misa li gnment of
incentives wi ll be more ev ident in firm s fi lin g for
vo luntary bankruptcy, where manage r have the
opportunity to use bankruptcy as part of thei r ove rall
corporate trategy.
Our tud y i th erefore an empiri cal in vest igati on
of differe nce betwee n firm s that fi le for vo lun tary
bankruptcy v . firms enteri ng in vo luntary bankruptcy via
cred itor petitions. We foc us on differences in the
financ ial hea lth and performance of these firm s, patterns
of in ider tradin g lead in g up to th e bankruptcy filin g,
and differences in th eir post-bankruptcy outco mes. We
find little difference in th e fin ancial conditi on of the two
ubgroup in th e yea r leadin g up to a bankruptcy fi lin g.
We find th at shareholders of firm s fi lin g for vo luntary
bankruptcy ea rn tock return s that are signifi ca ntly more
negative than shareh older of invo luntary filers,
howeve r, leadin g up to and follow in g the bankruptcy
ann oun ce ment. Wea l o find that insiders of firm s filin g
vo luntaril y are net ellers of their firm's shares in the
yea r leadin g up to bankruptcy, v . net in ider buyin g for
th e involuntary fi ler . Moreover, firms filin g vo lun tary
bankruptcy successfull y reo rga ni ze less frequent ly and
liquidate more frequ entl y th an firm s that file in vo lun tary
ba nkruptcy. These findin g are co nsistent with the idea
th at th ere is a greater reduction in manage ri al incentives
to max imi ze harehold er we lfare in firms filin 0o for
vo luntary bankruptcy vs . firm that are petitioned into
bankruptcy by th eir creditor .
The res ults of this study have implications for
regulator and legi lators that establish poli cy governin g
bankruptcy and insider tradin g laws. For exa mp le, ca ll s
for rev iew and refo rm of th e e laws have acco mpani ed
the recent hi gh-profil e bankruptcy fi lin gs of firm s such
a Enron and Global Cros in g, Ltd . Insiders of these
firm are e timated to have earned anywhere from $1
billion ( nron) to $ 1.3 billion (Global Crossin g) by

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The sa mpl e of firm s filin g fo r bankruptcy was
comp il ed by searchin g the Wall Street Journal Index,
Lexis/Nexis fi les, and from information obta ined from
the IndepthData Corporation and the New Generation
Research Company. Lexis/.Nexis search terms include :
vo luntary bankruptcy; volu ntary petition ; vo luntary
Chapter II ; involuntary bankruptcy; invo luntary
petition ; and involuntary Chapter II . All of the
in vo luntary fi lings repre sent court-fi led petitions by a
minimum of three creditors under rule 303 (b) I of the
1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. These petitions were filed
und er the grounds stipu lated in rule 303 (h) where the
"debtor is ge nerall y not pay in g debts as they become
due."
Firms were included in the samp le if th eir
bankruptcy filin g date occurs between October I, 1979
(the date th e Reform Act was implemented) and
December 3 1, 1994. We focus on these dates to avoid
the confoundin g effect of the unu suall y hi gh stock
return s earned durin g the period 1995-1999. The original
sampl e co ntains 368 voluntary and I I 0 involuntary
Chapter I I bankruptcy annou ncements. Firms were
subsequent ly eliminated from the sa mpl e if they were
privately held, or according to Lexis/Nexis were "not
pub li cly traded, too small , or otherwise inappropriate for
coverage. " App li cation of thi s screen reduced the sa mpl e
size to 222 vo luntary and 5 1 involuntary filings . Firms
with excessive miss in g return s on the Center for
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database were also
exc luded from the sample. Thi s furth er reduced th e
sa mpl e size to 176 vo luntary fil ers and 42 in vo luntary
filers. Additiona ll y, firm s that entered bankruptcy
primari ly due to adve rse outcomes in laws uits (e.g.,
asbestos cases) were del eted , a we re utilities and
financial firm ( IC codes in the 4900s and 6000s) due
to the regulatory constraints imposed on these industries.
App li cation of these screens reduced the final sample
size to 150 vo luntary and 34 involuntary bankruptcy
filin gs.
Table I presents the distribution of the sa mple over
time and by SIC code . The frequ ency of vo luntary and
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involuntary filings increases begi nning around the
"cred it crunch " of the late 1980s, and remains hi gh
through the 1991 recession. While the rate of
in vo luntary filings slows afterward, th e frequency of
vo luntary fi Iings remains curi ously hi gh through the
eco nomi c recovery of the early 1990s.

Thi s table describes the sampl e of firm s fi li ng
voluntary and in vo luntary bankruptcy petitions. The
percentages of total observations by yea r are shown in
the panel at left, and the perce ntage of total observat ions
by the first digit of the firm' s SIC code are shown at th e
pane l at ri ght.

Table 1: Sample Description by Year and SIC Code
vear

1980
19 81
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
199 1
1992
1993
1994

Obse rvatio ns byoYear
ns by S IC
vo luntarv
l y
in vo untar

3.3o/o
2.7%
9.3%
6.0%
1.3%
2.7%
0.0%
2.0%
1.3%
4 .0%
6.0%
18.7%
1-1 .7%
14 .0%
14 .0%

O bse
first S IC digit
I

2.9%
5.9%
2.9%
8.8%
5.9% 5
2.9%
2.9%
5.9%
2.9%
11.8%
8.8%
17.6%
8.8%
2.9%
8.8%

rvati

Cod e
volunta r v

lnvoluntarv

8.7%
12.0%
26.7%
8.0%

2

3
4

14 .7%
5.9%
26.5%
14 .7%
17.6%
2.9%
14 .7%
2.9%
0.0%

30.7%
6
7
8
9

2.7%
8.7%
2.0%
07%

Table 2: Desc riptive Statistics
Fir m C harac teri
s tic
mea n
(i n S IOOOs)
vo lunta r v
involarY
unt
165.950
.380
5 17
Book \ "a lu e of .-\ssets
-24.400
-6.800
:\ct In co me
2 11
.270
i\ l ar ket Ca pitalization
32.600
446.490
276.680
Sa les
0.534 .25
25 .02%
%
Lono-tcrm Debt Ratio
...
** * S1gmt· -!cantl y d 1fterent at the o ne and t1ve percent levels. respective ly.

voluntary

1.55
-0.38
1.9 1
1.97*
-1

4 7.420
-4 .970
12.-1 36
63.270

median
in vo lunt
a rY

163.230
-3 .3 10
16.460
22 60
1.0
3 1.67%

Wilcoxon

3.23 •
-0. 17
0.69
2. 1 5*
18.20%
0.82

for vo luntary Chapter 11 . The on ly evidence that the
voluntary filers mi ght be sli ghtly worse off financi all y
comes fro m comparin g th e average net income of th e
two groups. Although the mean ann ual ea rnin gs of both
groups are negative, th e vo luntary filers post sl ightl y
larger annu al losses on a signifi cant ly lower leve l of
annu al sa les. The average profit margin in the year
preced in g bankruptcy of the vo luntary filers is -8 .8% ,
co mpared w ith on ly -1.5% for the in vo luntary fi lers.
In the fo ll owin g section we co mpare the prebankruptcy performance and cap ital structure of the
vo luntary and involuntary fil ers . Mean and medi an
return on assets, operatin g margin and debt ratios for the
four years preceding th e yea r of th e bankruptcy
ann ounce ment are obtained from Co mpu stat. We
compare the pre-bankruptcy financial perfo rm ance and
capi tal structu re of the vo lun tary and involuntary filers to
see if differences in these variab les mi ght influence
managers' dec ision to fi le for voluntary Chapter II
bankruptcy.
We obta in daily stock price data fro m the CRSP
database to in vestigate differe nces in th e returns of the

The table above shows descriptive statistics for the
sample of firms filin g vo luntary and in vo luntary
bankruptcy petitions. Data are reported as year-end
fi gures fo r the yea r preceding th e bankruptcy
an noun ceme nt. The !-statistics and Wilcoxon stati sti cs
test whether the mean and med ian firm characteristi cs
are s ignifi cantl y different from one another. Descripti ve
statistics regarding the two types of firm s are shown as
table 2. These data are reported as year-end figures for
the year immedi ate ly precedin g the bankruptcy
ann oun ce ment. Examinati on of tab le 2 revea ls that firms
filing involuntary bankruptcy are large r th an the
vo luntary firm s in terms of both their book va lue of
assets and market ca pitalization. The involuntary fil ers
also have greater average sales vo lume than their
vo luntary counterparts, which would be expected give n
th eir larger size. We find little difference in leve rage
between the two types of firm s. In vo luntary filers have
an average long-term debt-to-assets rati o of 34% vs.
25% for the voluntary filers. Simi lar to the results
reported by Chatterjee, Dhiil on and Ramirez ( 1996), we
find that smaller firms with lower debt level s tend to fil e

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol1/iss1/3
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market model beta fo r the vo luntary filers is 0.6 7. which
inc reases to 0.85 in th e post-event period (days + 12 1 to
+270). The invo luntary filers experience a decrease_in
their beta from the pre-event (0 .85) to post-event pen od

·rn vo 1un tary
filers
immed iately
vo luntary
and
I
urroundin o th e bankruptcy ann oun
ceme n t, as we ll as
fo r the yea~ precedin g and fo llowin g the ann ounce ment.
Previo u researc hers (Rimbey. Anderson and Born ,
1995) report th at estimates of beta become un ~tab le
around ann oun ce ments of bankruptcy fi l i t~ gs. If nsk IS
chang
noi
as firms enter bankruptcy, usrng pre-eve nt
ma rk~t 1~1 ode l parameters may misstate the ac tual exce~s
retu rn s ea rn ed b\' t11ese fi rm s · We find that the fi rm s 111
our sa mpl e ex hibit j ust such a change in beta . The mean
pre-event (day -270 to -121) ordinary lea t squares

(0.24).

Due to the apparent instabili ty of beta, we report
ab norm al return s calcul ated without market mode l
parameters, usin g instead a meas ure of bu y an~ hold
compound returns adju sted for market effects ustn g th e
CRSP va lue-we ighted index of all NYSE and Amex
stocks .

"

ER!(aioh)

=

0 (1+ R,l )-

(1 +MR 1 )

( I)

sell ing leadin g up to .bankruptcy filin gs, howeve r
(Seyhun and Bradl ey 1997) .
We in vesti gate di fferences in in sider tradin g
benveen our samples of vo luntary and in vo luntary filers.
We report both th e net number of shares traded and total
dollar volume of trades by insiders. Fo ll owin g Seyhun
and Bradl ey ( 1997) we use a _narrow definiti on of
in siders: th e firm' s president, CEO, chairm an of the
board of directors, and all boa rd members. Finding
signifi ca ntly greater insider se lling among the vo luntary
fil ers wo uld prov ide upport for th e vi ew that managers
and oth er in siders of fi rm s filin g for vo luntary Chapter
11 bankruptcy have reduced incentives to maximize
shareholder va lue. Also, if managers possess superior
info rm ati on regardin g the fi rm's future prospects. finding
more in siders buyin g among th e in vo luntary filers al so
suggests th at manage rs of th ese firm s perceive a hi gher
probabi Iity of successful reo rga ni zati on than managers
of fi rms that fi le fo r voluntary bankruptcy.
We obtain data fro m The Directory of Obsolele
Securities, Lexis/Nex is, and Reuters Financial Services
regardin g post-bankruptcy outco mes . In particular, we
co mpare the rate with whi ch vo luntary and involuntary
fil ers merge with or are taken over by other finns ,
reorgani ze successfull y, or und ergo liquidati on. Previous
research (Hotchki ss 1995) concludes th at poor lon g-term
perform ance foll owin g bankruptcy is caused by the
continu ed in vo lve ment of th e manage ment team that led
the firm into bankruptcy. Finding a greater rate of failure
and/or liquidati on among th e voluntary filers would
prov ide furth er support for the idea that managers have
redu ced ince nti ves to max imi ze shareh older value when
firm s fil e for vo luntary Chapter II bankruptcy.

In Eq uati on ( 1), E R J(a to b)= excess return for fi rm
j from tim e peri od a to b (days -252 to +252 rela tive to

the bankruptcy ann oun ce ment day (day ze ro)): R, = the
1

1:

h

J=a

l=ll

ra\\ retu rn fo r fi rm j on day

n

and 1\fR 1 = th e retu rn on

the CRSP va lu e-\\ eighted index of all NYS E and Amex
stoc ks. As we co ntend th at insiders of firm s fi lin g
vo luntary ba nkruptcy ex peri ence a grea ter misa li gnment
of ince nti ves to max imi ze hareholder va lue. we expect
to fi nd signifi cantl y greater lo ses acc rui ng to
hareholde rs in the e firm s co mpared with shareholders
of fi rm s enterin g in vo luntary bankruptcy.
As would be expected in a stud y of fi rm s fi ling
ba nkruptcy. a sub tant ial number of th e fir ms in our
ampl e are delisted dur in g th e event window spannin g
davs 0 to +252 . Shumway ( 1997) exami nes th e ac curacy
of-th e delistin g retu rn s ava ilable on the CRSP database
and reports th at th ese return s are mi ss ing for th e
majority of fi rm s covered by CRSP. Failure to include
th e delistin g return s of the stoc ks in our sample in th e
buy and hold return ca lcul ati ons wo uld impart an
upward bias to these return s. We therefo re foliO\\ th e
reco mm endati on of Shum way and insert hi s estimate of
th e va lue of the ave rage mi ss in g delisting return on
RSP (- 30% ) for all th e fi rm s in our sa mple that have
mi sin g deli stin g return
We also in ve ti gate insider tradin g in th e years
lead in g up to th e bankruptcy filin g (years -2 and - 1)
and the year beginnin g with th e month in whic h the
ba nkruptcy ann ounce ment takes place (year 0). Data on
insider tradin g are obtained from th e SEC's Insider
Tradin g Ta pe . Loderer and heehan ( 1989) fi nd no
ev idence of in ider trading prior to bankruptcy, whil e
Go nell. Keown and Pinkerton ( 1992) fi nd that onl y
in ider of a daq fi rm "ba"il out prior to bankruptcy.
ore rece nt resea rch reports ignifica nt net insider

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We present our empirical results in the following
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fo ur s ub-secti o ns . The first sub-secti on re ports measures
of finn perform ance and leve rage for th e fo ur years
precedin g the year in w hi ch firm s ann o unce bankruptcy.
Th e second s ub-secti o n presents chan ges in s hareho lder
wea lth d urin g th e yea rs precedin g and fo ll owin g th e
bankruptcy ann o un ceme nt. T he third sub-secti on re po rts
in sid er trad ing leadin g up to and fo ll ow in g bankruptcy.
Th e fo urth s ub-sec ti o n presents th e post-bankruptcy
o utco mes for the vo luntary a nd in vo luntary fil ers.

leverage fo r the four years preceding th e year in w hi ch
firm s ann o un ce bankruptcy. We in vesti gate w heth er
there are signifi cant differences in profita bility and
leverage between the vo luntary and in vo luntary fi nn s
pri or to filin g fo r bankruptcy. If th e fi nancia l cond iti on
and performance of th e two ty pes of firm s is s im ilar
lead ing up to th e bankruptcy fi Iin g, it is less Iike ly that
finan c ia l factors are a s ignifi cant influ ence o n managers'
dec ision to fil e fo r vo luntary bankruptcy.
ormance and characteri st ic measures are
M ea 1 perf
presented in Pane l A . Return on assets ( ROA ) is
computed as in Hotchkiss ( 199 5):

Firm P erformance and Leverage Before Bankruptcy
Tab le 3 prese nts meas ures of firm perfo rm ance and

ROA = operating income before depreciation and amortization
total assets
Both types of firm s exhibit steady downtrend s in
their mean ROA fo r the fo ur years precedin g
bankruptcy. T he vo luntary fil ers ex hibit cons istent ly
hi gher ROA than th e in vo lun tary fil ers fo r eac h yea r

(2)

except year - 1, w hen th e ir ROA dec lines prec ipi to us ly.
Th e
di ffe rence-betwee n-th e-means
/-stati sti cs
are
in s ignifi cant fo r each year, ind icating no di ffe rence in
the mean ROA of th e vo luntary and invo luntary fil ers.

Table 3: Pre-Bankruptcy Performance
Pa nel A: mea n per fo rm a nce mea sure
re turn o n asse ts
vo lun tary
in vo luntary
r-statistic
o pe ra ting ma rg in
.15%
vo luntary
invo lun tary
/-statistic
lo ng-te
d e rm
bt
r a ti o
vo luntarv
in vo luntary
r-stat isti c
Pa nel B: medi a n pe rfo rm a nce mea s ur e
return on asse ts
vo luntary
in vo luntary
Wi lcoxo n
operating m :.~ rg in
vo lu ntary
in vo lunta ry
Wilcoxo n
lo ng-ter
m
d ebt ra tio
vo
luntary
in vo luntary
Wilcoxo n

na r -4

vca r -3

na r -2

vea r - I

8.18%
1.23%
4.82%
- 1.06

5.8-l
%
-1.88%
-0.90

-0.84%

-2
0.56%
0.5 1

-8 .25%
-7.53%
7
0.60

- 11.14%
0.87 %
1.1

25 .83%
30 .26%
0.96
vea r -4

26.72%
35 .20%
1. 80 1
na r -3

28 .68%
36. 19%
1.39
vea r -2

25 .02%
34.25%
1.4
vear - I

11 .00%
9.82%
- 1. 13

8.66%
7.82%
-0.90

6.61%
6.09%
0.86
.-0 52

-0
.08%
3.74%

6.92%
8.05%
0.40

5.73%
5.98%
0.64
8

4.46%
4.86%
1 65
0.

0.07%
3.66%
.4

25 .90%
30.64%
0.78

26.56%
36.95%
11.3

24 .58%
33.42%
1 .4

18.20%
3 1.67%
4
1. 77

3.3 ~ C}-O

0.53

-9
-3 .56%

-0.05
0.60

characteri sti cs of th e subgro ups are si gnifi ca nt ly
di ffe rent. T he next pe rfo rm ance meas ure re ported in
Pane l A of ta bl e 3 is mea n o peratin g marg in , defin ed as
operatin g in come/sa les. O peratin g marg in dec lines
steadil y durin g th e fo ur-year peri od, w ith th e excepti o n
of an in crease in year -1 fo r th e in vo lunta ry fi lers. We
find no signifi cant di ffe rence in th e mean o perat ing
marg in s of th e two types of firm s. Th e ave rage longterm de bt rati os (l ong-term de bt/tota l assets) for each
ty pe of bankruptcy fi Iin g are consi stent and sta bl e fo r th e

Th e ta bl e a bove prese nts firm c haracteri stic and
perfor ma nce meas ures fo r th e fo ur yea rs leadin g up to
the year of th e bankruptcy ann ouncement. Res ults are
re ported for th e subsampl es of firm s filin g vo luntary and
in vo luntary bankruptcy. Return o n assets is co mputed as
in
Hotchki ss ( 1995) : o peratin g in come before
deprec iati o n and a mo rti zati on/total assets. O peratin g
marg in = o pe ratin g in come/sa les , and the long-term de bt
rati o = long-term de bt/tota l assets. Th e /-stati stics and
Wilcoxo n stati stics test wh eth er the mea n and medi an
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ann ouncement (day zero) : days -2 52 to - 22: days - 2 1 to
+2 1; days - 1 to + I; and days +22 to +2 52 . Co mpound
buy and hold excess return s (see equati on I) are reported
in tab le 4. The buy and ho ld return s fro m days - 2 1 to
+2 1 are also shown as fi gure I , and the buy and hold
returns from days -252 to +252 are shown as fi gure 2.
Durin g the peri od precedin g the bankruptcy
ann ounce ment (days -252 to - 22) the stock price
perfo rmance of th e vo lun tary fil ers is significant ly more
negat ive than th at of th e in vo lun tary fi lers: - 81 .2% vs.6 1.5%. The e buy and hold return s are signifi cantly
different at the one percent level (1 = I 1.9 1). Ove r th e
two month peri od immedi ately preced in g and followin g
the ann ounce ment (days -2 1 to +2 1), the vo luntary fil ers
al o exhibit greater losses: -3 1.2% vs. -22.4% for th e
involun tary fi lers (1 = 5 . 8~) . The bu y and hold return s
immed iate ly surroundin g th e bankruptcy ann ounce ment
(days - I to + I) are also signifi ca ntl y more negati ve for
the vo luntary fil er : - I 0.3% percent vs . -5 .4% percent
for the in vo lun tary firm s (1 = 3. 19). Figure I shows that
the return s of th e tvvo type o f fi rms are similar from
day -2 1 to -2, but th e more negati ve returns earned by
vo luntary
fil ers
around
th e
bankruptcy
the
ann oun ce ment persist through day +2 1.

fo ur years leadin g up to bankruptcy. Once again, there is
no ignifi ca nt di ffe rence in leve rage between the
vo lun ta ry and in vo luntary fi lers in an y of the preba nkruptcy yea rs.
Panel B of tab le 3 prese nt medi an performance and
characteri tic meas ures fo r the two types of fi rms. The
fi ndin gs are si mil ar to th o e pre ented in Panel A. ROA
and operat in g margi n are dec lining fo r each of th e four
pre-bankru ptcy yea rs. Lo ng-term debt rati os are
con i tent and tab le. and none of the measures reported
are ignifica ntly different in any of the years leading up
to bankruptcy. We interpret th e e findin gs a ev idence
that the fi nancial perfo rm ance and leverage of th e two
type of fi rm s are simi lar durin g the pre-bankru ptcy
period . Both vo luntary and in vo lun tary fi ler are in the
mid t of a long-term dec li ne in profitabi lity, and neither
ex hi bit a signifi cant chan ge in leverage prior to
ba nkruptcy. There i no ev idence that differences in the
pre-ba nkruptcy fi nancial conditi on o f th e e fi rms
in fl uences th e type of bankruptcy fi lin g.
Cha nges in ha reholder Wea lth
We exa min e change in shareholder wea lth
ove r fo ur tradin g periods relati ve to the bankruptcy

r -. .

Figure 1: Buy a nd H old Excess Returns F rom Days - 21 to +21
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The fig ure hown above depi cts compound
buy and hold exce s return fo r th e ubsamples
f
fi nn
fi ling vol untary and
in vo luntary

ba nkruptcy. The trad in g window span days - 2 1 to
+2 1 relati ve to th e bankru ptcy ann oun ce ment (day
zero).

Figure 2: Buy a nd Hold Excess Returns From Days - 252 to +252
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The fi gure in the previ o us page depicts compound
buy and ho ld excess return s (computed as shown in
Equation I) for the subsamples of firm s filin g voluntary

and involuntary bankruptcy. The tradin g wi ndow span s
days -252 to +252 relative to the bankruptcy
announcement (day zero).

Table 4: Buy and Hold Excess Returns

Sigmfican

Tradino Window
Voluntary
Involuntary
/-statistic
11.9 1.
-252 to -22
-81 .2%
-61 .5%
5.82 ' '
-21 to +2 1
-3 1.2%
-22.4%
-1 to+ l
·10.3%
-5.4%
3.19"
+22 to +25 2
· 57 .1%
y
15.26'
·36.3%
••
tl diffe rent from zero at the one percent level.

T he table above re ports compo und buy and ho ld
excess return s (co mputed as shown in Eq uat ion I) for
th e s ubsa mpl es of firms filin g vo luntary and involuntary
bankruptcy. T he trading window defi nes the days
relative to t he eve nt day over w hi ch th e excess returns
are meas ured (day zero = the day the firm anno un ces it
is filin g fo r o r has been petit ioned into bankruptcy). The
!-stati sti cs test w hether the buy and ho ld excess return s
of the vo luntary and in vo luntary filers are signifi cantl y
different from eac h oth er. Over the e leven month s
following the bankruptcy ann o uncement (days +22 to
+252) the vo luntary filers cont inu e to post s ignifi cantl y
greater losses than the in vo luntary tilers: -57 . I% vs. 36.3% for the in vo luntary til ers (t = 15.26) . This findin g
is co nfirm ed by exa min atio n of Fi gure 2. In a ll four
subperi ods exa min ed , th e vo luntary filers earn excess
return s that a re signifi cant ly more negati ve th an the
invo luntary fil ers. The ma rket evidentl y interprets the
ann oun cement of a vo luntary bankruptcy ti li ng as more
negat ive for the future prospects of he firm than the
ann o uncement of an invo luntary ban kruptcy petiti o n
tilin g by the finn's creditors. These findings are
consistent w ith the idea that corporate in s ide rs in tinn s
tilin g fo r vo luntary bankruptcy have reduced incenti ves
to maximize share ho ld~r welfare thro ugho ut the C ha pter
I I process co mpared with manage rs of firm s that are
petitio ned into in vo luntary bankruptcy.

the month in w hi ch the bankruptcy an no uncement takes
place (year zero) . Pane l A of table 5 shows th at in s iders
of firms ti Iin g vo luntary bankruptcy are net se llers of
shares in all three years, with the largest volume of net
shares so ld occurrin g in the year immedi ate ly precedin g
the bankruptcy tiling (year - I ). This co ntrasts sharply
w ith the trading pattern s of in si ders in firms tilin g
in vo luntary bankruptcy. In s iders of these firm s are net
buyers of shares in years -2 and - 1, and se ll
s ignifi ca ntly less shares in the year fo llowi ng the
bankruptcy ann o un cement (an average of 27,000 shares
vs. 72,000 for the vo luntary tilers).
These results are a lso depicted as fi gure 3,
w hi ch s hows the cumul at ive in sid er trading in shares for
both types of firms . In the two years precedin g and th e
year of the bankruptcy ann ouncement, in s iders of finn s
filin g vo luntary bankruptcy divest them se lves of over
300,000 shares, w h ile in s id ers of firm s petiti o ned into
bankruptcy by th e ir creditors acc um u late over 20,000
new shares durin g th e same peri od . We interpret th ese
findin gs as strong evidence that in s iders o f firms filing
vo luntary bankruptcy have a greater redu ct io n in their
in ce nti ves to max imi ze s hareho lde r wea lth compared
with in sid ers of firm s filin g in vo luntary bankruptcy.
T hi s tabl e reports ave rage in s ider tradin g per firm
for the sampl es of firm s filin g vo luntary a nd in vo luntary
bankruptcy. In siders are defined as th e firm 's president,
CEO, and members of the board of directors. Results are
reported for the two years preceding bankruptcy and the
year of the bankruptcy tilin g (yea r zero) . Pane l A reports
the net number of shares traded, by yea r and
cumul at ive ly. Pane l 8 re po rts the net do llar amount of
in sider buy in g or se lling, by year and cumulatively.
Pan e l 8 of table 5 reports average annual net doll ar
volume of in s ider tradin g for vo luntC~ry a nd involuntary
tilers. C umulative average net do llar trading by insiders
of both types of firm s is al so de picted as fi gure 4.
Although in s iders from both types of firms are buyers in
net do llar terms in year -2 , th e average buying by
insiders of the invo luntary fil ers is over fo ur times that

Insider Trading Preceding and Following the
Bankruptcy Announcement
Res ults regardin g average in sider tradin g for the
two types of bankruptcy filin gs are presented in table 5.
We report the average annual net number of shares
traded by insiders (Panel A) and the average annual net
dollar volume of trade by in s iders (Panel B). In both
cases, a negative number indicates that in s iders are
divesting them se lves of the stock of their firm ( in term s
of shares or dollars), and a positive number indicates that
in siders are accumulating stock in their firm . Results are
reported for year<> - 2, -1 and the year beginning with
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involuntary filers accumulate approximately $2 million
in new stock during years -2 to 0, while insiders of
vo luntary filers divest themse lves of approximate ly
$300,000 in stock ove r the same period. These findings
prov ide further evidence that the mi sa lignment of
incentives thought to occur during bankruptcy manifests
itse lf most strongly among managers and insiders
voluntari ly placing their firms into Chapter I I
bankruptcy.

of ins iders from the voluntary filers . In year -1 insiders
in voluntary firms become net ellers in dollar terms.
while insider in involuntary firms co ntinue to be net
buyers. In yea r zero insiders in both types of firms
are net se llers in dollar terms, but th e net dollar
sell ing by in siders in the vo lun tary firm s is more
than five times greater than th at of the invo luntary
in iders. These results are confirmed by examining
figure 4, which shows that, on ave rage, insiders of

Tab le 5: Insider Trading Around the Bankruptcy Announcement

olunta!)

Panel A : In sider Tradi na (i n S hares)
,·ear -2
vear - I
:'\et In side r T radi ng
-6. 190
-224.726
Voluntary
In volun tary
38.263
9.42 I
year -2
C umul a ti ve i\'et In sider Tradi nl!
vear - I
Voluntary
-6. 190
-230.9 I 6
47.684
Involuntary
38.263
Panel B: Insider Tradina (i n Dollars)
:>let In sider Tradi
ng
vea r -2
year -I
Voluntal)
$340.4 7-1
Jnvoluntan
$1.-175.593
$542.827
C umulative :'\et In sid er Tradi ng
vear -2
vear -I
Voluntal)
$340.4 74
-$20.75 I
Jnv
$I
.4 75.593
$2.0 I 8.420

vear0
-72.028
-26.864
yea r 0
-302.944.
20.820
vear 0
-$293 .948
-$53 .922
vear 0
-$31 -1 .699
$ I .964.498

-$361.225

Figure 3 shown below depicts cu mul ati ve net insider tradin g in shares for years -2, -I and zero rel at ive to the yea r
of the bankruptcy filing (year zero).
Figure 3: Cumulative Net Insider Trading (Number of Shares)
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Figure 4: Cu mulative Net Insider Trading (Dollar Volume)
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Thi s table reports post-bankruptcy outcomes for the
samples of firms filing vo luntary and involuntary
bankruptcy. Information is obtained from The Directory
of Obsolete Securities , Lexis/Nexis, and Reuters

Financial Services . The difference between the means /statistic tests whether the mean post-bankruptcy outcome
for the subgroups are s ignificantly different from one
another.

Table 6: Post-Bankruptcy Outcomes
Type of BankruptcY Reso luti on
Mergersffakeovers and Acq ui siti ons
Success ful Reorgani zation
Liquidati ons/Fai lures
• S..1gn1fi cant at the five percent leve l.

Vo luntary Firms
15 .9%
42 .1%
42. 1%

lnvoluntan' Firms
15.2%
60.6%
24 .2%

of both types of firm s are simil ar in the years precedi ng
the bankruptcy announcement, which indi cates th at prebankruptcy financial performance and capital stru cture
are not significant determin ants of the type of
bankruptcy filin g. We present ev idence th at th e
shareholders of firm s filin g vo luntary Chapter II suffer
significantly greater losses at the tim e of the bankruptcy
announcement than sharehold ers of firms petiti oned into
bankruptcy. Moreover. in s iders of firm s filing voluntary
bankruptcy are net se llers of their firm 's stock in th e
years leading up to bankruptcy, both in term s of shares
and dollar tradin g volume, while in s iders of invo luntary
filers are found to be net buyers of their firm's stock over
the sam e period . These findin gs stron g ly suggest a
greater mi sa li gnment of manage r/shareholder interests in
firm s filing for vo luntary bankruptcy . We a lso find that
firm s filing for vo luntary bankruptcy successfully
reo rga ni ze less frequently and liquidate mo re freq uently
than firms entering bankruptcy via in vo luntary creditor
pet ition s.
In summary, firm s filing for voluntary bankruptcy
exhibit a more negat ive market reaction to th e
bankruptcy announcement, a hi gher leve l of insider
se llin g, and a greater frequency of negati ve postbankruptcy outcomes than firms e nterin g bankruptcy via
creditor-initiated petitions. T hese findings provi de
support for the idea that in siders of firm s filing for
voluntary bankruptcy have red uced incentives to
max imize shareholder wealth compared with the insi ders
of firm s filin g invo luntary bankruptcy. The results of
this study are important for regulators and leg is lators
that establish policy governin g bankruptcy and in sider
trading laws, as U.S . bankruptcy law and the laws
gove rnin g insider tradin g leadin g up to bankruptcy
filings are drawin g increased scrutin y, and are likely to
undergo sign ifi cant reform in the near future .

Post-Bankruptcy Outcomes
Finally_ we compare the post-bankruptcy o utcomes
of th e two types of firms . Information is obtained from
The Directory of Obsolete Securities, Lexis/Nex is, and
Reuters
Financial
Services. These
results are
summari zed in Table 6. The rates with which the two
types of firms merge with or are taken over by other
firm s a re almost identical: 16% of the vo luntary filers
and 15 % of the in vo luntary fi lers emerge from
bankruptcy as part of a merge r o r takeover. There are
signifi cantly different pattern s in their respective rates of
reorganization a nd Iiquidation, however. Sixty-one
percent of th e involuntary filers eventua lly comp lete a
successful reo rga nizati o n, compared w ith o nl y 42% of
the vo luntary filers. Forty-two percent of the vo luntary
filers eve ntu a lly liquid ate their firm s, while only 24% of
the vo luntary fi lers meet a simi lar fate . The lower
fre quen cy of successful reorganizati on and hi gher rate of
liquidati o n for the vo luntary fil ers provides further
s upport for the view that in siders of firms filin g
vo luntary bankruptcy have a greater reduction in their
incenti ves to max imize shareho lder wealth than the
in siders of firm s that are petitioned into bankruptcy by
their creditors.

CONCLUSIONS
Previous studies reach different conc lusions
regarding how much responsibility for financial di stre ss
rests with the firm ' s managers . We hypothesize that
these findings may be due to differences in the behaviors
of managers filing voluntary C hapter 11 bankruptcy vs.
managers of firms that are petitioned into bankruptcy by
their creditors. We argue that greater misalignments of
manager and s hareholder interests are more like ! ~ to
occur w hen managers choose to place the firm mto
C hapter 11 v ia a vo luntary bankruptcy petition than
when firms are petitioned into bankruptcy by their
creditors.
We find that the financial performance and leverage
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Difference Between the Means /-s tatistic
-0. 18
1. 88
2.00
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